This week started with two political events that concerned the EU: On the one hand, Greek voters approved of Alexis Tsipras’ way of dealing with the Greek economic and political crisis. On the other hand, the European Ministers of the Interior agreed on a quota to relocate 120.000 refugees among the EU member states.
These events may appear to be distinct, but if one focuses on their structural causes a lot of similarities between both phenomenons can be detected. They both happened in an insufficient pre-crisis set-up during which warnings were ignored, and national rather than European interests were pursued. Once the problems became manifest and could no longer be ignored both cases led to a situation in which the persistence of the European Union, or part of its political achievements, were put into question. This was the case because national politicians did not seem to be willing, and European politicians did not seem to be entitled, to reach an agreement on a structural reform of the EU. Finally, both crises called for an exceptional role of German politics to absorb the foreseeable and avoidable negative consequences, caused by a regulatory framework which itself is strongly influenced by German politics.
